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We develop and estimate an entry model for second price and open outcry independent private value
auctions where potential bidders receive an imperfectly informative signal about their value prior to
deciding whether to pay a sunk entry cost. In this way the model flexibly allows for selection on values,
which will affect an entrant's subsequent competitiveness, at the entry stage. As signals become more
informative, the entry process exhibits greater selection as firms with higher values are more likely
to enter. We allow for asymmetries across bidders and unobserved heterogeneity across auctions, which
are important features of most data sets. We show how incorrectly assuming the extremes of either
no selection (no signal) or perfect selection (prior knowledge of one's value) - the common alternatives
in the literature - can yield incorrect estimates of model primitives and bias the results from counterfactuals.
We apply our model to U.S. Forest Service timber auctions and find strong evidence in favor of a selective
entry process. We take advantage of the flexible entry model to reevaluate the well known theory result
that with fixed participation a seller prefers an extra bidder over the ability to set an optimal reserve
price. In our model, the relative value of setting a reserve price and increasing the number of potential
entrants to a revenue-maximizing seller will depend on the degree of selection. Our structural estimates
imply that, if the USFS wants to maximize revenues, it will benefit more from adding an additional
















Empirical entry models typically ignore the possibility that the entry process tends to select entrants
with unobserved characteristics, such as lower marginal costs or higher product quality, that make
them subsequently more competitive.1 As a result the possibility that rms choose to participate
because they know that they are likely to be particularly competitive is ruled out. In this paper,
we set-up an estimable selective entry model for an empirically important setting - auctions - and
show that allowing for selective entry can have important implications for the estimation of the
distribution of bidder values and counterfactuals. We estimate our model using data from U.S.
Forest Service (USFS) timber auctions in California where we nd strong evidence in favor of
selection. We use our estimates to revaluate, in the context of entry, a well known result from
auction theory (see Bulow and Klemperer (1996)) that with xed participation a seller prefers an
extra bidder over the ability to set an optimal reserve price. In our model, the relative value of
setting a reserve price and increasing the number of potential entrants to a revenue-maximizing
seller will depend on the degree of selection. Our structural estimates imply that, if the USFS
wants to maximize revenues, it will benet more from adding an additional potential entrant than
setting an optimal reserve price.
In many auction settings bidders must make sunk investments to better understand the potential
returns to participating in the auction. A few examples (which correspond to the leading applica-
tions in the empirical auction literature) include timber auctions where bidders need to \cruise" the
tract they are bidding on to learn about the trees they will harvest, procurement auctions, such as
those for highway paving contracts, where bidders must assess the project in order to gauge the likely
cost of completing the job and oshore oil tract auctions where bidders conduct seismic surveys
to form expectations about the amount of oil present. Despite their importance, entry processes
have only recently been incorporated into empirical auction research. When models include these,
the assumptions made about bidders' information are often extreme. For example, one assumption
is that bidders have no private information about their value prior to paying the entry cost. An
alternative assumption is that bidders know their value perfectly before paying an entry cost. These
models are based on Levin and Smith (1994) and Samuelson (1985), respectively. Throughout the
paper we refer to these as the LS and S models. These polar cases are rarely going to be correct
and a more reasonable modeling assumption lies somewhere in between. This is the type of model
we explore in this paper.
Specically, we estimate a two-stage entry model for second price or ascending independent
private value (IPV) auctions with asymmetric bidder types which we refer to as the Signal model.2
In the rst stage potential bidders simultaneously decide whether to participate in the auction,
1The typical formulation in the static entry literature (e.g., Berry (1992)) allows that rms with higher " draws
are more likely to enter. However, these " draws do not directly aect the protability of other rms, and so they
are more appropriately thought of as shocks to xed costs or sunk entry costs that are irrelevant to market outcomes
conditional on entry. Similarly, the dynamic entry literature assumes that entrants receive iid shocks to their entry
costs but are otherwise symmetric.
2The focus on a second price model makes the exposition easier. Our empirical work allows for the fact that the
auctions we use are open outcry auctions rather than second price sealed bid auctions.
2which entails paying a sunk entry cost that enables them to learn their value exactly. In the second
stage, entrants submit bids, which in the equilibrium of a second price auction will be equal to their
values. We allow for selection by assuming that each potential entrant gets a private information
signal about its value before the entry decision is made. Equilibrium for each type of bidder
is characterized by an entry threshold whereby their signal must be suciently optimistic about
their value to justify paying the sunk entry cost. The signal's precision determines how selective (on
values) the entry process is. If the signal is very uninformative, then the marginal and inframarginal
value distributions will be very similar (little selection) and outcomes will approach those of the
LS model. On the other hand, when signals are very informative, these distributions will be quite
dierent (a great deal of selection) and outcomes will approach those of the S model.
We believe that this set-up corresponds to how one might think about entry decisions in both
timber and other auction settings. In the timber auction setting, bidders have dierent values for
timber tracts reecting their individual capacity utilization, specialities and downstream contracts.
The potential entrants' own knowledge of the forest, together with the information provided by the
government prior to the auction (e.g., its estimates of wood volume and species type), will allow a
potential bidder to form an estimate of his value (the signal). If it decides to enter, then the rm
will do its own survey of the tract and undertake other costly investments (which represent the
entry cost) to exactly ascertain its value.
The degree of selection matters because it determines the dierence between the values of the
marginal and infra-marginal entrants. Ignoring this dierence will bias estimates of the distribution
of values, which is the central object of interest in much of the empirical auction literature. For
example, ignoring selection may lead one to believe that values are higher and less dispersed than
they really are because the set of values that are observed tend to be drawn from the upper part of
the distribution. In a setting with asymmetric bidder types, one will tend to overestimate the mean
values of weaker types because these rms are particularly likely to enter when they get especially
high signals. This may mask dierences across bidder types and also aect the predictions of any
counterfactual that impacts the entry margin.
For example, consider a subsidy to encourage greater participation in an auction. With selection,
the marginal entrant who is attracted into the auction by the subsidy is less likely to be valuable
to the seller than in a model without selection where the marginal and inframarginal entrants
look alike. The degree of selection also aects what happens to sellers' revenues as the number of
potential entrants increases. As shown in the original LS paper with symmetric rms, expected
revenues decrease with the number of potential entrants in a model with no selection once rms
enter with probability less than one.3 In contrast, revenues tend to increase when there is enough
selection. We use this dierence to support our contention that there is a selective entry process in
our data. Another reason that selection may matter is that it impacts the optimal reserve price,
a crucial tool in mechanism design. The well known result that, with a xed set of bidders, the
seller's optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders and should be set above his
3The symmetric equilibrium in a symmetric LS model involves rms using mixed strategies.
3value (see Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981)) breaks down when entry is introduced.
Moreover, the new optimal reserve pricing rule is not robust to dierent models of entry. In the LS
model it is optimal to set the reserve price independent of the number of bidders and at the seller's
value, while in the S model it is optimal to set it above the seller's value and increase it in the
number of bidders. For this reason it is prudent to be exible in the amount of selection a model
permits.
In our empirical application we estimate our model using several approaches (Nested Fixed
Point, Nested Pseudo-Likelihood and Simulated Maximum Likelihood with Importance Sampling)
that dier in the extent to which they allow us to handle asymmetries in the parameters across bidder
types (in our example, timber mills and logging companies), heterogeneity across auctions and the
possible existence of multiple equilibria. To our knowledge the nested pseudo-likelihood procedure
has yet to be applied to an auction environment. Therefore, through a variety of Monte Carlo
experiments, we show that this latter estimator performs well in uncovering the true parameters
of the data generating process, even when it approximates the LS or S models. Consistent with
reduced form evidence, the coecient estimates suggest quite a selective entry process, resulting in
a marked dierence between the value distributions of the marginal and inframarginal entrant.
We take advantage of the exible entry model to reevaluate the well known theory result re-
garding the benets of competition. Specically, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that with xed
participation a seller prefers an auction with no reserve to one with an optimal reserve but one less
bidder. That is, the seller is willing to give up his main revenue extraction tool and potentially \give
away his object for nothing" in favor of attracting one more bidder. Extending this result to settings
with costly entry is not straightforward. In particular, depending on the amount of selection in the
entry process, the seller may not prefer to increase the number of potential entrants if he must
lose the ability to set an optimal reserve price: increasing competition does not necessarily justify
the seller relinquishing all of his bargaining power. Our exible model of entry, therefore, can be
usefully employed to understand the benets of competition when entry is costly. Our structural
estimates imply that, if the USFS wants to maximize revenues, it will benet more from adding an
additional potential entrant than setting an optimal reserve price.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature, Section 3 introduces
our model and discusses its identication, Section 4 illustrates the importance of selection, Section
5 presents our estimation methods, Section 6 turns to our empirical application, Section 7 uses our
estimates to compare the benets of auctions and negotiations to the USFS and Section 8 concludes.
The appendices include alternate estimation methods and results.
2 Literature Review
In the empirical auction literature (see Hendricks and Porter (2007) for a recent survey) bidders'
decisions of whether or not to participate in an auction are frequently ignored. When the set of
bidders is not considered xed, the most common entry model used is the LS model. Examples
4include Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming) who examine timber auctions, Bajari and Horta csu
(2003) who consider coin auctions on eBay and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (forthcoming) who an-
alyze procurement auctions. Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2008) and Erta c, Horta csu, and Roberts
(forthcoming) analyze entry in auctions using experimental data and some structural techniques.
In a recent paper Li and Zheng (2009) compare the eects on competition in procurement auctions
stemming from both the LS and S models. On the other hand, we are interested in a less restric-
tive model that does not assume these extreme entry models. Such a model has been proposed in
the literature before. For example, Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) consider such a model in
their testing of competitive equilibrium bidding in oshore oil auctions. In a recent paper Marmer,
Shneyerov, and Xu (2010) consider testing whether the LS, S or a general aliated signal model of
entry best explains bidding behavior in procurement auctions. The idea behind their test is, relying
on exogenous variation in the number of potential bidders, to examine whether the distributions
of entrants' valuations varies with the number of potential bidders. Using the same data as Li
and Zheng (2009), they nd support for the S model and their aliated signal model. They also
estimate a very simple version of their model with symmetric bidders and no unobserved auction
heterogeneity, a feature that has been shown to be important in other settings (Krasnokutskaya
(forthcoming), Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming), Roberts (2009), Hu, McAdams, and Shum
(2009)). In this paper we estimate a fully structural model of entry and bidding in independent pri-
vate value ascending auctions with asymmetric bidders and unobserved heterogeneity. The objects
of interest will be bidders' true value distributions (that is the value distribution of any poten-
tial bidder, not only a participant), signal distributions and entry costs. The aim is to illustrate
the biases in demand estimation and counterfactual analysis when the incorrect model of entry is
employed.
One of our goals is to eectively incorporate bidder asymmetries into the model and estimation.
With asymmetric bidders, the choice of a exible entry model may be particularly important.
For example, consider an LS model with asymmetric types under the assumption that all rms
within a type use the same strategy (type-symmetric). When there are multiple types, no type-
symmetric equilibrium in this model can have some, but not all, rms entering within more than
one type. This might make it impossible to rationalize what is observed in many data sets without
introducing additional shocks to entry costs. A Signal model can explain these patterns by rms
receiving dierent signals about their values.
Einav and Esponda (2008) and Bhattacharya, Roberts, and Sweeting (2010) estimate this pa-
per's imperfectly selective entry model when the post entry game is a rst price auction. This case
presents the increased computational challenge of solving the equilibrium bid functions along with
the entry decisions. Both papers adapt a parametric approach and the latter allows for unobserved
auction heterogeneity.
Performing counterfactual analyses is one goal of estimating our structural model. In related
work, Brannman and Froeb (2000) use a sample of 51 Oregon timber auctions to evaluate various
counterfactuals such as mergers and bidder preference programs. The entry margin, which they
5ignore, is likely to be particularly important for programs that encourage entry by weaker bidders
such as bid subsidies or preference programs. Krasnokutskaya and Seim (forthcoming) apply the
LS model to highway procurement to assess current bidder preferential treatment programs where
small contractors receive subsidies to make them more competitive with their larger rivals. Their
analysis nds that the eects of the program and its resulting impact on government costs vary by
project, but in general, smaller bidders have an increased chance of winning. Assuming the opposite
model of entry, Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) simulate a theoretical model in order to evaluate
(computationally) bid preference programs when bidders know their value prior to participation.
They nd that the eect of preference programs on bidder participation is relatively unimportant.
This paper is also related to the literature on estimating incomplete information entry games.
In the canonical entry model in this literature, each rm receives a private information shock to
its entry cost, and in equilibrium rms choose to enter if their draw is high enough. In our model,
potential bidders choose to enter if their signal about their value is high enough. However, an
important dierence is that in our model the signal and the entry decision are correlated with how
competitive the rm is once it enters, whereas in the standard model the draw on the entry cost
has no eect on how competitive the rm is once it enters. Instead, the natural analogue of our
model in other entry settings would be one where rms receive noisy signals about their post-entry
marginal costs or qualities.4 Roberts and Sweeting (2010a) adapts the framework presented in this
paper to a non-auction setting: airlines. There, the goal is to measure the true eect that potential
entrants have on limiting prices in a Cournot game when actual market participants are a selected
set of rms.
Finally, in our empirical application we focus on auctions for the right to log federally owned
forestland. There is now a long line of empirical auction literature analyzing these auctions (see
Paarsch (1997), Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997), Haile (2001) and Athey and Levin (2001)
to name a few). We are the rst to employ our more general model of entry to these data. In
a companion paper (Roberts and Sweeting (2010b)) we evaluate the USFS's returns to switching
their sales mechanism from the current format in which bidders compete simultaneously to one in
which the USFS approaches bidders sequentially. This alternate format allows bidders to preempt
future potential entrants from participating by submitting higher bids earlier in the process. We
nd that when entry is selective, as we indeed nd that it is in these timber auctions, it is often the
case that the USFS could improve revenues and eciency by switching their allocation mechanism
to a sequential format.
4Of course, one might consider a model that combined both an imperfectly informative signal and a random shock
to entry costs. However, if both sets of draws are iid then it is not obvious that the precision of the signal and the
variance of the entry cost shocks can be separately identied except by functional form assumptions. We discuss
identication of our model in Section 5.2.
63 Model
We now present our model of entry into auctions. We begin by introducing the model and showing
that it is characterized by a cuto strategy whereby bidders only enter auctions when their signal
is suciently high. For much of the discussion we refer to the mechanism as being a second price
auction. However, given our informational assumption that bidders have independent private values,
the strategies introduced here are akin to those in an English Button auction.5
3.1 A General Entry Model with Selection
We consider a series of t = 1;:::;T second price IPV auctions. In any auction there is a set of
potential bidders who may be one of  = 1;:::; types. Let the number of potential bidders of
any type  be N and the number that choose to enter the auction be n. Bidder values V are
distributed according to FV
 (V ) where the dependence on their type is made explicit. For any
auction a the object may dier according to observable and unobservable dimensions and thus we
allow the distribution to be auction specic FV
a(V ). One observable dimension along which auctions
may dier is the seller's reserve price. Bidders know the distributions from which their own and
their competitors' values are drawn. There are two stages to the game, an entry stage and an
auction stage.
At the start of the entry stage every bidder observes the set of potential bidders and a signal
S (we drop the i subscript for now) which is aliated with their value of the object. If they pay
an entry cost K they learn their value for sure. For expositional ease, we will focus on the special
case where S = V + ", V  N(;2
V ) and "  N(0;2
"). In practice 2
" and 2
V may also depend
on . Therefore E[SjV ] = V , "  F"() and E["jV ] = E["] = 0.6 Given these assumptions, we
can characterize a bidder's posterior value distribution after observing a signal s. In particular,
the bidder now believes his value is drawn from N( + (1   )s;02












". During this entry stage all bidders simultaneously decide whether or not to pay
a xed cost K to observe their true value for the object. Any bidder that does pay K proceeds
to the auction stage of the game.7 In some simulations and in our empirical example we consider
an alternative model where S = V A, A = e", V  logN(V ;2
V ) and "  N(0;2
").
At the auction stage of the game bidders who paid K to learn their true value participate in
the auction. In our second price auction setting, bidders submit their true value regardless of how
many bidders entered. The object is awarded to the highest bidder at a price equal to the second
highest bid or the reserve price (which bidders knew at the entry stage), whichever is greater.
A bidder's strategy in this game must include a rule for entering, as a function of his signal, and a
5When we introduce our estimation strategy in Section 5, we extend our methodology to cover more general models
of bidding in open outcry auctions which won't require all bidders to bid up to their true value. We are also currently
working on extending the analysis to rst price auctions.
6Many of our results, and indeed the intuition for our modeling contribution, could be established with a more
general model of the relationship between a bidder's signal and his value (perhaps they are aliated, for example).
However, since our ultimate goal is to take the model to the data, for clarity sake we present this more specic model.
7Here we assume that any bidder must pay K to participate in the auction.
7rule for bidding as a function of his value and (potentially) his signal. In a second price auction, the
dominant bidding strategy is to bid one's value. An optimal entry strategy must involve entering
if and only if the signal lies above some threshold, as shown in the following proposition. This
threshold signal is implicitly dened by the zero prot condition whereby the bidder receiving it is
indierent between staying out and paying the entry cost and entering the auction.8
Proposition 1. The optimal bidding strategy for entrants is to bid one's value. The optimal entry
strategy is given by a signal threshold s0
 for any type  bidder such that he pays the entry cost if
and only if his signal s > s0
.
Proof. Let M i be the set of entrants other than bidder i. Entrants submit a bid to maximize their
expected prot conditional on entry:




Standard arguments show that participants have the dominant strategy to bid their value regardless
of the number of potential bidders or asymmetries among them. This strategy is equivalent in
an ascending auction. Prots are increasing in a bidder's value. Because signals and values are
aliated, a higher signal leads the potential entrant to raise his beliefs about his value and because
signals are independent across bidders, it does not alter his beliefs about other bidders' post entry
competitiveness. Thus, for any signal at which the bidder enters, he would enter for any higher
signal and for any signal at which he does not enter, he would not enter for any lower signal.
Therefore an equilibrium entry rule follows the threshold rule. An equilibrium exists because any
bidder's reaction function is continuous in his and his opponents' thresholds. Q.E.D.
If  = 1, then there is one symmetric equilibrium, which is also true in the LS and S models.
This is established in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. With one type of potential entrant there will be a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that there are two symmetric equilibria, where potential entrants have cutos s
1
and s
2 respectively and s
1 > s
2. Consider a potential entrant i. For any vi; i's expected prots
from entering will be increasing in s
 i, the cut-o used by all other players as for any set of v is
an increase in s i reduces the probability that rivals will enter. From this it follows that i's best
response cuto to s
 i is decreasing in s
 i. If so, if s
1 is i's best response to s
1, it cannot also be
the case that s
2 is i's best response to s
2, so that s
1 and s
2 cannot both be symmetric equilibrium
thresholds. Q.E.D.
While the above proposition proves the uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium with one bidder
type, there can still be asymmetric equilibria. However, only the symmetric equilibrium exists as
the number of potential bidders grows large.
8We explicitly dene the zero prot condition in Section 5.
83.1.1 Multiple Equilibria with Asymmetric Bidders
Entry models typically have multiple equilibria that dier according to which rms enter. Even
when we focus on \type-symmetric" equilibria (i.e., ones in which all rms of a particular type using
the same cut-o) and second price auctions (with a dominant strategy equilibrium in the bidding
game), there can be multiple equilibria for some values of the parameters. The possible existence of
multiple equilibria inuences our empirical specications and our choice of estimation techniques.
To see why multiple equilibria arise, consider a simple case where there are two types of rms
( = 2), and one potential entrant of each type. Values are distributed N(;2
V ) for each type,
with 1 = 200 and 2
V = 25. For both types, signal noise is normally distributed with 2
" = 10; and
K = 20. The left panel of Figure 1 shows the best response functions for each rm, where 2 = 200
so that the types are identical and the reserve price is 100. The s0s where the reaction functions cross
are Bayesian Nash equilibria and because the types are identical in this example, there is a symmetric
equilibrium (on the dashed 45o line) where both types have the same strategies. However, there
are also two asymmetric equilibria. At the top-left intersection of the reaction functions, the type 2
rm enters if it gets a signal above 115, which is almost certain for these parameters, whereas the
type 1 rm enters only if it gets a signal greater than 218, which is less likely. The entry thresholds
are reversed at the bottom-right intersection.
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Figure 1: Reaction functions for symmetric and asymmetric bidders. In the left panel there are two
symmetric bidders with values distributed N(;2
V ), with  = 200, 2
V = 25, 2
" = 10; and K = 20.
In the right panel we introduce asymmetries only in means; all other parameters are as in the left
panel. The thin lines correspond to means of 200 and 190 and the bold lines correspond to means
of 200 and 160.
The right panel of Figure 1 shows what happens when we introduce asymmetry among the rms.
Here the two types have dierent mean values but share the other parameters. Type 2 is assumed
to have a lower mean value, with either 2 = 190 or 2 = 160. A reduction in 2 causes type 2's
reaction function to move to the right. However, it also causes type 1's reaction function to shift
9down, i.e., it becomes more willing to enter, since for a given s0
2 type 2 is likely to have a lower value
if it enters, which makes type 1 entry more protable. Given the inverse S-shape of the reaction
functions, which reects the shape of the underlying value and error distributions, there remain a
maximum of three possible equilibria. However, the direction of the shifts mean that there is only
one equilibrium where the type 1 rm, with the higher mean value, has the lower s0. An equilibrium
of this form continues to exist even when the dierence in mean values is large enough that there
is a unique equilibrium, which is the case when 2 = 160.9 This type of equilibrium seems more
plausible in the sense that the higher value types should hold the advantage, and it will tend to
lead to more ecient allocations.10
When we adopt estimation methods that require an equilibrium selection model, such as Maxi-
mum Likelihood using a Nested Fixed Point algorithm and Simulated Maximum Likelihood using
Importance Sampling, we will assume the equilibrium played is the one where the higher value types
have the lower s0s and that the parameters apart from  are common across the types (even if they
dier across auctions) since otherwise there may be multiple equilibria where the high type has a
lower s0.11 However, this selection rule is an assumption. We therefore also consider an estima-
tion technique - Nested Pseudo-Likelihood - that is (at least potentially) more robust to multiple
equilibria in the sense that it may be able to converge to the equilibrium played in the data.12 In
doing so, we can also relax the assumptions that the parameters 2
V ; 2
" and K are common across
the types, as we no longer need assumptions that will generate only one equilibrium of a particular
kind.
3.1.2 Marginal and Inframarginal Bidders with Selection
We now illustrate how bidders' observation of a signal about their values \selects" the types that
enter. We do this by examining the dierence between the value distributions of entrants and those
bidders who received a signal just low enough to stay out of the auction, what we term to be the
\marginal bidder". This is an important distinction when considering the benet of the marginal
bidder participating, say due to a subsidy. In the LS model these distributions are the same. In
the Signal model, however, the bidder receiving a signal s = s0 will have a value distribution that is
rst order stochastically dominated by the value distributions of entrants. This is clearly shown in
9Other changes in the parameters can also tend to lead to a unique equilibrium. For example, small entry costs,
dispersed values or very uninformative signals can all tend to atten the reaction functions leading to single intersec-
tion/equilibrium.
10Note that the analysis does not depend on having a single rm of each type. With multiple rms there will still
be a symmetric equilibrium when the types have equal values and a decrease in the mean value of the second type will
still cause the equilibrium best response function (i.e., the best response that solves only for the equilibrium among
players of the same type) will shift to the right and the equilibrium best response function of the type 1 players will
shift down. However, with multiple players the best response curves can tend to be atter which also tends to favor
the game having a unique equilibrium.
11An alternative approach would be to follow Sweeting (2009) and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (forthcoming) by
estimating an equilibrium selection mechanism that allows for a mixture of dierent equilibria to be observed in the
data.
12Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2010) note that because Nested Pseudo-Likelihood is based on best response
iterations it may not be robust if the equilibrium played in the data is not locally stable.
10Figure 2. The left panel of Figure 2 displays the average value distributions of entrants and marginal
bidders in the Signal with a precise signal and LS model. The right panel of Figure 2 displays the
average value distributions of entrants and marginal bidders in the Signal with a less precise signal
and LS model. It is clear that as the signal noise increases, the Signal model approaches the LS
model.
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Figure 2: Each gure compares value distributions for marginal bidders and entrants in the LS and
Signal model. For each V  N(200;25) with K = 20 and N = 6: In the signal model S = V + ",
"  N(0;"). The left panel compares the value distributions for \marginal" bidders according
to LS model and a Signal model with a lot of selection: " = 5. The right panel compares the
value distributions for \marginal" bidders according to LS model and a Signal model with a lot of
selection: " = 50.
4 Illustrating the Importance of Selection
In this section we illustrate why allowing for selection eects at the entry stage is important. To
do this we rst show how applying the incorrect entry model to the data causes the econometrician
to incorrectly estimate demand. Second, we consider a relevant counterfactual question involving
entry subsidies to show how this type of policy-relevant question may be incorrectly addressed when
too restrictive models are taken to the data.
Incorrectly Estimating Demand
As stated above, far and away the most commonly used entry model in empirical auction work is the
LS model. Here we consider what happens to parameter estimates when the true data generating
process is the Signal model but the econometrician estimates the LS model. Table 1 shows the
estimated parameters of the value distribution when the family is correctly chosen (that is a normal
11N b  = 120 c V = 25 b K = 10 s0
3 132.0222 17.8262 20.8270 106.8737
4 137.3831 16.2657 18.2699 116.1196
5 141.0022 15.4720 17.5082 122.1247
6 143.6077 14.5615 17.0921 126.4939
7 146.2489 14.2386 16.8575 129.8908
8 147.8688 13.4926 16.2295 132.6493
9 149.4981 13.2966 15.7235 134.9597
10 150.9570 12.9902 15.3284 136.9395
Table 1: Incorrectly Estimating Demand, LS Model. The table displays estimates of model parameters
assuming the LS model. Based on generating T = 5000 auctions where S = V + ", V  N(;2
V ) and
"  N(0;2
"). Here " = 5. We solve for s0 as the equilibrium outcome for this game for each value of N and
this appears in the last column.
distribution is correctly assumed) but the LS is incorrectly applied. We generated data using our
Signal model for given parameters (shown in the table) and then estimated V ; V ; K.13
The intuition for the results in Table 1 is straightforward. By employing the LS model, the
econometrician wrongly assumes that bids observed in the data are placed by representative bidders
since, supposedly, there is no selection eect. In reality, bidders with high signals chose to enter
and this is correlated with higher values, thereby biasing the econometrician's estimates of the
value distribution. In particular, the estimated distribution under the LS model will rst order
stochastically dominate and be second order stochastically dominated by the distribution under
the Signal model.14 To understand the consequences for estimating the entry cost, one needs to
consider the two models' predictions about entry. The LS model predicts greater equilibrium entry
than does the Signal model since the greater dispersion of values of actual entrants increases the
option value of participating for potential entrants. For example, at the true value distribution and
entry cost parameters, if bidders have no signal about their value (the LS model), they enter 50.4%
of the time. If they have a signal distributed as in Table 1, bidders enter 39.9% of the time. With
an overestimated mean value, this eect will be compounded. There will also be a countervailing
force due to the underestimate of V . This is because the surplus conditional on winning is smaller
the lower the standard deviation of values. On net, these three eects lead the LS model to predict
more entry than is observed in the data and it justies this \low level of entry" by overestimating
K. This bias in K will fall as N increases since the LS model won't predict as much of an increase
in entry as does the Signal model and so the increased entry will be partially attributed to lower
and lower entry costs.
We can consider a similar experiment with the S model. The results of incorrectly assuming the
data generating process is the S model, when in fact it is the more general Signal model, appear
in Table 2. The table shows the estimated parameters of the value distribution when the family
13Here we imagine that we have a very large data set over which to estimate the parameters. Analogously, we could
set T to be smaller but replicate the small set of T many times.
14The second order stochastic dominance follows immediately from V > 
0
V whenever " > 0.
12N b  = 120 c V = 25 b K = 10 b s0 s0
3 115.9863 29.7016 7.0017 97.5955 106.8737
4 113.1916 31.7532 7.4736 106.1968 116.1196
5 111.6691 32.5119 8.0142 112.9868 122.1247
6 109.6941 33.6069 8.2450 117.1782 126.4939
7 107.8251 34.5973 8.2982 120.2677 129.8908
8 106.2405 35.2924 8.3522 123.0219 132.6493
9 103.2874 36.9834 8.3002 124.0900 134.9597
10 103.3601 36.5966 8.2759 126.7540 136.9395
Table 2: Incorrectly Estimating Demand, S Model. The table displays estimates of model parameters
assuming the S model. Based on generating T = 5000 auctions where S = V + ", V  N(;2
V ) and
"  N(0;2
"). Here " = 5. We solve for s0 as the equilibrium outcome for this game for each value of N. b s0
is the equilibrium outcome for the S model for each value of N.
is correctly chosen (that is a normal distribution is correctly assumed) but the S is incorrectly
applied. We generated data using our Signal model for given parameters (shown in the table) and
then estimated V ; V ; K and s0.
The intuition for the results in Table 2 is the opposite of that for Table 1. The S model will
predict even greater selection eects than our model and so its estimated value distribution will be
rst order stochastically dominated by and second order stochastically dominate the distribution
from the Signal model. Also, the S model should predict less entry than the Signal model and it
will justify this by underestimating K.
The results in Tables 1 and 2 clearly illustrate the problems from assuming the wrong entry
model. In Table 1 we overestimate V and K and underestimate V . The problem is exacerbated
when the sample becomes \more" selected as seen in the s0 column. Table 2 illustrates similar
problems in estimating demand. In particular, since the model assumes that bidders have full
information prior to paying their entry cost, the model underestimates the entry threshold of the
true model. These biased estimates will lead to a host of problems in counterfactual analysis, which
we turn to next.
Biasing Counterfactuals: Subsidies
As in any setting, working with biased estimates of demand will tend to make the economist err
in counterfactual analysis. While there are many examples showing how incorrectly estimating
demand may cause problems for policy recommendations, we choose to focus on one that directly
stems from the selection problem which is ignored by the LS entry model: entry subsidies.
In a setting where bidders have sunk entry costs it may be attractive for a seller to subsidize
the entry costs of some or all bidders (see for example Athey and Levin (2006)). In procurement
auctions there may be additional policy reasons for favoring subsidies. For example, the Federal
Government is mandated to buy a certain percentage of services from small businesses and it may
be necessary to oer them some kind of inducement - whether in the form of an entry subsidy or
13by subsidizing or favoring their bids directly - in order to meet this aim. Here, we look at a very
simple example to show how estimating a model without selection could give misleading predictions
about the eects of a subsidy.
To be specic, we consider a Signal model with N symmetric rms, whose values are distributed
normally with  = 120 and V = 25, entry costs K = 10, a signal with " = 5 and no reserve. With
these parameters, it is expected that between 2.2 and 2.6 rms enter the auction as the number
of potential entrants varies from 4 to 10. In this case there is some probability that there are no
entrants or only one entrant and it is potentially attractive for the seller to encourage entry. We
imagine that the seller does this by paying a subsidy to any rm that enters, and we assume that
the seller can identify which rms enter (pay K) and which do not, with the aim of increasing
the expected number of entrants by 1. The columns \Correct Subsidy Amount" and \Correct 
Revenue" in Table 3 show the expected cost per bidder of the subsidy and the expected increase in
revenues, respectively, when the seller uses the true model.
On the other hand, one can consider the alternative case where the seller estimates the LS
model (using an innitely large sample, so he gets the estimates reported in Table 1) and then
calculates the expected cost and benet of increasing the expected number of entrants by one using
these estimates. These results appear in columns \Incorrect Subsidy Amount" and \Incorrect 
Revenue" in Table 3, respectively. Two dierences are clear. First, using the LS model results in
overestimating the increase in revenues that results from additional entry because it ignores the
fact that the rms who are attracted are less valuable than the inframarginal entrants. Second, it
also overstates the cost of inducing additional entry. This happens because by using the LS model's
estimates, the seller believes that entry is very costly so that it is necessary to give a large subsidy
to get more entry. In addition, the low estimate of V reduces the amount of surplus that an
additional entrant can expect to get if he wins (the expected dierence in the rst and second order
statistics). In this example, these eects dominate the fact that in the LS model the additional
entrant does not expect to be at a disadvantage to the rms that would have entered without the
subsidy. Overall, the percentage biases in the revenue eects are signicantly larger than the biases
in the cost eects.
5 Estimation
We estimate a fully parametric model where the distributions, up to parameters, of both values and
signal noise are known to the econometrician. We consider three approaches to estimation, which
dier in their ability to handle heterogeneity (either in values across auctions or in the parameters
across auctions and across types of bidder) and in their assumptions about equilibrium selection.
We are particularly interested in whether all of the models/techniques give estimates that suggest
the entry process is highly selective. In this section we only describe the estimation procedure that
most will be familiar with: nested xed point. In the appendix we describe the importance sampling
and nested pseudo-likelihood approaches that we also consider.
14N E[N] Correct Subsidy Incorrect Subsidy Subsidy Correct  Incorrect  Revenue
Amount Amount Bias Revenue Revenue Bias
4 2.24 9.31 13.40 -21.7% 22.28 31.75 42.69%
5 2.33 8.61 12.08 -19.4% 21.51 29.69 35.48%
6 2.40 8.17 11.26 -17.9% 20.80 28.16 30.75%
7 2.44 7.87 10.66 -16.6% 20.41 26.98 27.80%
8 2.48 7.66 10.38 -15.9% 20.26 26.54 24.40%
9 2.51 7.50 10.01 -15.1% 20.57 26.42 27.40%
10 2.53 7.37 9.77 -14.7% 20.33 26.02 24.73%
Table 3: Biased Subsidy Analysis. The table displays the eects of incorrectly assuming that the LS
model is the true entry model on counterfactual analysis. The counterfactual nds the necessary reduction
in K to generate an increase of one participating bidder in expectation. The table shows the correct and
incorrect estimates of this subsidy. It also shows the bias in the relative changes of this subsidy and indicates
that the LS model underestimates the relative change in K needed to induce one more bidder in expectation.
It also shows the estimated impacts on seller revenues and the percent bias in this estimate. Again, it shows
the LS model over predicts the impact on seller revenues from this subsidy. Based on generating T = 5000
auctions where  = 120, V = 25, " = 5, K = 10. We solve for s0 as the equilibrium outcome for this game
for each value of N. The parameters used to estimate the subsidy and revenue impacts in the incorrect case
appear in Table 1.
5.1 Nested Fixed Point Estimation (NFXP) using Maximum Likelihood
NFXP estimation involves solving the game for each auction at each iteration of the parameters.
If there are multiple equilibria for a given set of parameters, we have to pick which is played in
order to calculate the likelihood. As explained above, we assume that the parameters 2
V ;2
" and
K are the same across entrant types and solve for the only type-symmetric equilibrium where the
type with higher mean values has a lower s0. If other equilibria exist, we assume that they are not
played.
We solve for the equilibrium entry thresholds by solving the pair of non-linear equations that
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pdf of the distribution of values for the type  rm.
Given the equilibrium entry thresholds, we calculate the likelihood of the observed outcome of
the auction. We assume that potential entrants who do not submit any bid at the auction did not
enter (and so did not pay K). Because the auctions operate as open outcry auctions, rather than
second-price sealed bid or button auctions, it is not entirely clear how the observed bids should be
15treated. For example, the highest bid submitted by a losing bidder may be below his true value. In
this case we lack a well-dened model for what determines the bid that we do observe. We therefore
proceed by assuming that, when the second highest observed bid is greater than the reserve price,
that this bid represents the valuation of the second highest bidder.15 Losing bidders who attend
the auction are assumed to have values between this second highest bid and the reserve price. For
example, the likelihood for a particular auction a when a type 1 bidder wins the auction, a type
2 bidder submits the second highest bid of b2a, and na rms of type  enter out of Na potential
entrants is:














































reecting the contributions to the likelihood of the second highest bidder, the winning bidder, the
other entrants and the non-entrants, respectively. The equilibrium entry thresholds will depend on
the parameters and auction characteristics, such as the reserve price which have been suppressed
to reduce notation.16
5.1.1 Observed and Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
A feature of the data is that there is considerable variation in realized prices, appraisal values
(USFS predicted sale values and costs) and reserve prices across tracts. This suggests that it is
important to control for observed auction heterogeneity. It may also be important to control for
unobserved heterogeneity in values across auctions, since observable variables - such as the USFS's
appraisal value and its estimates of logging costs and manufacturing costs, together with year and
county dummies - explain less than 50% of the variation in realized revenues, and previous research
(Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming)) has found evidence of signicant unobserved heterogeneity
15Alternative assumptions could be made. For example, we might assume that the second highest bidder has a
value less than the winning bid, or that the second highest bidder's value is some explicit function of his bid and the
winning bid. In practice, 96% of second highest bids are within 1% of the high bid, so that any of these alternative
specications should give similar results. We have computed some estimates using the winning bid as the second
highest value and the coecient estimates are indeed similar.
16If an entrant wins at the reserve price, then the likelihood is calculated assuming that winning bidder's value is
above the reserve.
16in timber auctions.17
A limitation of the NFXP algorithm is that computation time increases quickly in the number
of parameters. To reduce the number of parameters we therefore attempt to control for observed
heterogeneity in a rst stage in a manner similar to that suggested by Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006).
To do this, we rst regress the log of the auction's reserve price on observed variables including the
USFS's appraisal value for the tract and its estimates of logging and manufacturing costs. We then
normalize bids and reserve prices using the predicted values from these regressions to remove the
predictable component of variation and make the auctions more homogenous.18
We also use NFXP to estimate a model that allows for normally distributed unobserved het-
erogeneity in mean values across auctions. To be precise, we assume that for a given auction a
1;a = 1 + a and 2;a = 2 + a where a  N(0;2
); and 1;2 and 2
 are included in the set
of parameters to estimate. The parameter 2
 reects the importance of unobserved heterogene-
ity, which is assumed to be uncorrelated (conditional on the regressors included in the rst stage)
with reserve prices or the number of potential entrants. We integrate out the one-dimensional
heterogeneity using a set of grid points, resulting in a simulated maximum likelihood estimator.
5.2 Identication
While we make parametric assumptions to estimate the model, here we consider informally what can
identify the parameters of the model.19 With no unobserved auction heterogeneity, the distribution
of values would be non-parametrically identied if entrants submit their values as bids and there is no
selection. The entry process with signals can approach the no selection case when the equilibrium
signal threshold for entry is very low. The equilibrium entry threshold falls when there are few
potential entrants and the reserve price is low. With asymmetric bidder types, the weaker type,
who will typically be more selected, will have a lower equilibrium entry threshold when there are
no competitors of the stronger type.
If the distribution of values were identied from this type of variation in s0, then the distribution
of signal noise and the level of entry costs would be identied from the amount of entry and changes
in the distribution of observed bids (values) as s0 varies due to dierences in the reserve price and
the number (and type) of potential entrants across auctions. For example, if signal noise is very
precise then the distribution of values of entrants will be almost perfectly truncated at s0. On the
other hand, if signals are very imprecise, because " is large, then the distribution of values among
17Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming) estimate the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in a rst stage where
they estimate a parametric bid distribution. This approach is aided by observing multiple informative bids per auction
in sealed bid auctions. In open outcry auctions, it is less plausible that bids except the second-highest or winning bid
should be treated as reecting a bidder's value.
18This will only be valid if reserve prices, which we use as the dependent variable, are set non-strategically, which is
a standard assumption in the timber auction literature. One could control for observed heterogeneity in other ways,
such as normalizing directly by some combination of the USFS's predicted sale value and its measures of costs. For
example, Marmer, Shneyerov, and Xu (2010) use the engineer's cost estimate for their lawn mowing contracts. In
practice, sale values and logging costs seem to have greater predictive power for both realized prices and reserve prices
than other cost estimates, so we prefer to use a regression based approach which naturally allows some factors to be
more important than others.
19Marmer, Shneyerov, and Xu (2010) and Einav and Esponda (2008) discuss identication in rst price auctions.
17entrants will be more similar to the underlying distribution of values in the population. K will be
identied from the probability of entry (higher K will reduce entry) and, because of the zero prot
condition, the amount of surplus the marginal entrant can expect in the auction if it enters.
As this discussion makes clear, identication of the parameters depends on having reliable mea-
sures of the number of potential entrants. In future revisions, we will look more carefully at how
our estimates depend on how the set of potential entrants is dened. The discussion also assumes
that rms bid their values and there is no unobserved cross-auction heterogeneity. In our data,
auctions operate as open outcry auctions, so it is unreasonable to treat all of the observed bids as
values. For example, losing bidders may have values above the highest bids that they announce (see
Haile and Tamer (2003)). Also, unobserved heterogeneity may be important. For these reasons it
is necessary to take a fully parametric approach, even though there is a lot of variation in reserve
prices and the number of potential entrants.
6 Empirical Application
We now illustrate how ignoring selection into auctions matters and how to implement our method-
ology in an empirical setting. We focus on federal auctions of timberland in California. We rst
describe the data, then discuss why our model applies to the setting, then provide evidence of
selection in these auctions and nally present our estimation results.
6.1 Data and Context
We focus on federal auctions of timberland in California.20 In these auctions the USFS sells logging
contracts to individual bidders who may or may not have manufacturing capabilities (mills and
loggers, respectively). When the sale is announced, the USFS provides its own \cruise" estimate
of the volume of timber on the tract. It also announces a reserve price and bidders must submit a
bid of at least this amount to qualify for the auction. After the sale is announced, bidders perform
their own private cruises of the tract to assess its value.21 These cruises can be informative about
the tract's volume, species make-up and timber quality. Finally, bidders must post a deposit of 10%
of the appraised value of the tract in order to be eligible to participate in the auction.
As in our model above, we assume that bidders have independent private values. This as-
sumption is also made in other work with similar timber auction data (see for example Baldwin,
Marshall, and Richard (1997), Brannman and Froeb (2000), Haile (2001) or Athey, Levin, and Seira
(forthcoming)). A bidder's private information is primarily related to its own contracts to sell the
harvest, inventories and private costs of harvesting and thus is mainly associated with its valuation
only.
In our model we allow bidders to receive an imperfect signal about their value prior to paying an
investment cost to fully learn their value. There are multiple reasons why it is likely that in these
20We are very grateful to Susan Athey, Jonathan Levin and Enrique Seira for sharing their data with us.
21From our discussions with industry sources, it is very rare for rms to bid without doing their own cruise.
18timber auctions bidders only have imperfect knowledge about their value prior to entry. First, each
tract is unique and therefore even if a bidder has previously bid on apparently similar tracts, they
must still account for heterogeneity not realized prior to further investigation. Second, the cruise
estimates published by the USFS may be imprecise. We provide evidence of this below. Finally,
bidders must also devote time to planning and organizing their team of harvesters and lining up
potential end users for any given tract. These are likely to be only a few of the necessary investments
a bidder must make prior to learning its true value for a particular stand of timber. Therefore, a
model which at least allows bidders to have a noisy signal about their value, but can still permit
this signal to be fairly precise, seems warranted.
We should note here that our selection model diers from Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming)
who use similar data but apply the LS model so that bidders have no signal about their value at the
entry stage. They allow for two types of bidders (mills and loggers) and their model assumes that
mills' value distribution stochastically dominates loggers', according to a hazard rate order. Their
proposition 1 states that if the necessary condition for a unique type-symmetric equilibrium is met,
then mills must enter with probability 1.22 In estimation the authors conrm that the necessary
condition is met for each tract in their data.
From the original data we focus on the most appropriate auctions. As our methodology so far
addresses ascending or second price auctions we eliminate all sealed bid auctions. We also eliminate
small business set aside auctions, salvage sales and auctions with extremely low or high acreage or
volume to acreage ratios as these are likely either outliers or coding errors in the data. Finally,
we examine auctions between 1982 and 1989 to reduce resale concerns that might complicate the
analysis (see Haile (2001) for an analysis of these auctions with resale). Resale was limited after
1981 because third party transfers (i.e. the winner transferring the right to harvest the timber)
were prohibited and speculative bidding was reduced due to shortened contract lengths, larger re-
quired deposits, greater penalties for default and increased diculty of obtaining contract extensions
(Mead, Schniepp, and Watson (1983)). This is important because another model with resale like
that of Haile (2001) could lead to increased bidding with increased competition, a comparative
static also consistent with a selection model. We are left with 988 auctions over this period.
In addition to the USFS data, we add data on (seasonally adjusted, lagged) monthly housing
starts and establishment locations. The rm location data (NETS data) was purchased from Walls
and Associates who obtained the data from Dun and Bradstreet. For bidders we can identify in the
NETS data, we obtain their latitude and longitude and this enables us to determine their distance
from any auction. We are able to match 43.3% of rms but these rms account for 70.5% of bids
and 71.0% of winning bids.
We summarize the data in Table 4. Bids are given in $/mbf (1983 dollars). We see that bids
submitted by loggers tend to be lower than those submitted by mills, consistent with the results
in Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming), but in our sample loggers win less often than in theirs.
We dene entrants to be the set of bidders we observe at the auction even if they did not submit a
22The other alternative is that loggers enter with probability 0. This is robustly rejected in their data.
19bid above the reserve price. We count the number of potential entrants as those bidders who bid
within 50 km of an auction over the next month. One way of assessing the appropriateness of this
denition is that less than 2% of the bidders in any auction fail to bid in another auction within 50
km of this auction over the next month. For our estimation we assume that all entrants paid the
xed cost of entry.
Fewer loggers than mills enter on average and they are also less likely to enter. Among the set of
potential logger entrants, on average 34% enter, whereas on average 66% of potential mill entrants
enter. Finally, 4% of tracts failed to sell because they received no bids.
Our model assumes that within type, bidders may have heterogeneous values, but not entry
costs. If we believe that bidders do receive noisy signals about their value prior to entry, we can
appeal to the panel nature of our data set to investigate whether there appears to be large, persistent
dierences in entry costs across bidders. This is because large dierences in entry costs would cause
those bidders with high entry costs to stay out of auctions unless they receive quite an optimistic
signal about their value, in which case they will be likely to win. In the data, then, we can examine
whether bidders who rarely enter are more likely to win when they do enter. We begin by focusing
on bidders who are often within a reasonable distance from any auction and divide these into two
groups based on how often they bid. We then will see whether the group which rarely bids is more
likely to win than those who bid often. If this is true, then it is suggestive of persistence in entry
costs as those bidders who rarely bid do so because of high entry costs, not low values. To proceed,
we isolate a set of bidders to be those who on average are within 76.5 km of an auction, the median
distance in the data, and look at the probability of winning conditional on a bidder bidding in more
than 15 auctions compared to those who bid in between 5 and 15 auctions. We nd that the former
win 61.2% of the time they enter and the latter wins only 14.5% of the time they enter. Therefore,
this suggests that there is not a great deal of persistent heterogeneity in entry costs across bidders
of a certain type.
We stated earlier that government cruise reports can be inaccurate and thus bidders are incen-
tivized to invest in learning their true value for the tract. We can support this claim in our data
because for a sample of \scaled" sales we have data on the timber that was actually cut by the
winner.23 Using this information, we can evaluate the quality of the government's estimates. On
average, the government overestimates the amount of timber on the tract 60% of the time. The top
panel of Figure 3 displays the distribution of these incorrect estimations in percentage terms.
It is possible that what matters more to bidders is the government's estimate of the distribution
of species type on any tract. One way to gauge their accuracy along this dimension is to compare
the predicted and actual share of timber for the species that the USFS said was most populous.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 displays the distribution of these incorrect estimations in percentage
terms. To interpret the gure, `10' means that the share of the (supposedly) most prevalent species
was estimated to be 10% higher than it actually was.
Given the potential error in the government's estimates, and the inconsistency of this error, the
23This is the same data used in Athey and Levin (2001).
20Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th-tile 50th-tile 75th-tile Min Max N
WINNING BID ($/mbf) 92.54 150.43 39.22 69.89 125.01 2.04 4255.73 945
BID ($/mbf) 77.46 92.82 29.5 58.37 106.36 2.04 4255.73 3944
LOGGER 64.98 58.01 23.14 48.37 90.53 2.04 723.96 1072
MILL 82.11 102.46 32.55 62.25 113.55 5.29 4255.73 2872
LOGGER 0.27 0.44 0 0 1 0 1 3944
LOGGER WINS 0.18 0.38 0 0 0 0 1 945
FAIL 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 988
ENTRANTS 3.99 2.47 2 4 5 0 12 988
LOGGERS 1.09 1.32 0 1 2 0 10 988
MILLS 2.91 1.89 1 3 4 0 10 988
POTENTIAL ENTRANTS 9.98 6.45 5 9 14 1 38 988
LOGGER 5.26 4.71 2 4 8 0 27 988
MILL 4.73 2.78 3 4 6 0 14 988
PREVIOUS MILLS (6 mos) 4.57 2.85 2 4 7 0 14 988
SPECIES HERFINDAHL 0.55 0.23 0.35 0.51 0.72 0.20 1.00 988
DENSITY (acres/mbf) 0.21 0.21 0.07 0.16 0.28 0.02 1.81 988
VOLUME (hundred mbf) 75.17 45.41 41.05 68.6 103.1 5 275.4 988
HOUSING STARTS 1610.74 267.8 1580.5 1628 1782 843 2260 988
RESERVE ($/mbf) 37.95 32.36 16.38 27.3 47.89 2.04 221.87 988
SELL VALUE ($/mbf) 291.05 64.18 259.51 292.29 326.03 0 518.95 976
ROAD CONST ($/mbf) 12.23 14.33 1.06 7.49 17.76 0 91.55 976
LOG COSTS ($/mbf) 116.53 33.13 98.4 113.12 133.78 0 252.46 976
MFCT COSTS ($/mbf) 134.46 24.09 127.07 136.22 146.15 0 227.55 976
MISSING APPRAISAL 0.01 0.11 0 0 0 0 1 988
DISTANCE (KM) 86.91 122.58 37.7 60.2 86.48 0.86 1017.84 2702
Table 4: Summary statistics for California ascending auctions from 1982-1989. We exclude SBA set
asides, salvage sales, auctions with very high or low volume to acreage ratios and failed sales. For calculating
when a logger wins, we focus only on auctions where the tract sold. We count the number of potential entrants
as those bidders who bid within 50km of an auction over the next month. Statistics about the potential mill
bidders over the previous 182 days that bid in the same forest district is also given by PREVIOUS MILLS.
We note that 26% of all bids are losing bids at the reserve. SPECIES HERFINDAHL is the Herndahl
index for wood species concentration on the tract. SELL VALUE, ROAD CONST, LOG COSTS and MFCT
COSTS are USFS appraisals of the value of the tract and the road building, logging and manufacturing costs
of the tract, respectively. HOUSING STARTS is the seasonally adjusted, lagged monthly housing starts in
a tract's county. DISTANCE is the straight line distance between a bidder's establishment location and a
tract's centroid.
21Figure 3: Evaluating the quality of the government's predictions.
22government's estimates are useful but not perfect in describing these tracts. Therefore, bidders
likely nd it valuable to undertake their own investment to more precisely learn about their value.
Moreover, our discussions with industry sources conrm that it would be extremely unlikely for
bidders to participate without previously undertaking their own cruise.
6.2 Evidence of Selection
In this section we provide evidence that actual bidders in an auction are not a random sample of
potential entrants from the data. We do this by examining the impact of the number of potential
entrants on submitted bids.
One test for selection is whether the average valuations of bidders rise as the number of potential
entrants increase. If there is no selection, then bidders are a random sample from the population
regardless of the number of potential entry. This is the essential idea behind the test in Marmer,
Shneyerov, and Xu (2010). If we believe that bidders' strategies in the auctions examined here
are the same as in a classic English Button Auction with independent private values, then we can
consider bids submitted to be bidders' valuations. Thus, we can examine whether valuations increase
in potential entry by looking at the submitted bids as potential entry increases. These results appear
in Table 5. Examining the rst four columns, we nd that a 10% increase in potential entry leads to
a 1.6% increase in the submitted bid (0.9% when we control for distance), thus providing evidence
of selection. A confounding factor is that there may be unobserved auction heterogeneity that is
driving both increased potential entry and submitted bids. That is, there may be factors observable
to the bidders but not to the econometrician that aect bidder behavior. To control for this we follow
a strategy similar to Haile (2001) and instrument for the number of potential bidders by the number
of mills who bid in the same forest during the preceding six months. If we believe mill location and
activity are determined well before a particular auction's unobservable (to the researcher) quality
is realized, then this is a valid instrument. The estimates employing this instrument appear in the
last four columns. We continue to nd a positive impact of potential entry on submitted bids. In
fact, the impact increases by almost three-fold.24,25 While there may be some concern about this
instrumental variable strategy, in our structural estimation we do not rely on this method to control
for unobserved heterogeneity. Here we are simply interested in providing suggestive evidence that
there is selection at the entry stage for these timber auctions.
There is some concern about interpreting bids as values in these auctions since they are not
exactly English Button Auctions, but rather open outcry auctions (see for example Haile and Tamer
(2003)). If we assume that any bid submitted is a value, it is safest to assume that the highest
24If we include the reserve price, following the arguments made in Roberts (2009), to control for unobserved
heterogeneity, we also nd evidence of selection. We are less enthusiastic about this route since it seems that the
reserve pricing function used by the USFS may not always lead to reserve prices being monotonic in unobservable
quality (Haile and Tamer (2003)).
25One might not expect the magnitude to increase. Two potential explanations for this eect are that we are
actually instrumenting for the number of mills, and an additional potential mill entrant is more valuable than an
additional potential logger entrant, and measurement error. In future revisions we aim to more clearly parse these
potential explanations' eects.
23OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log POT. ENTRANTS 0.157 0.155 0.083 0.092 0.361 0.381 0.221 0.281
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.09)
LOGGER -.159 -.145 -.121 -.100 -.166 -.154 -.125 -.101
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.032) (0.029) (0.03) (0.027) (0.032)
SCALE 0.246 0.178 0.082 0.231 0.167 0.064
(0.061) (0.056) (0.067) (0.061) (0.056) (0.067)
SPECIES HERFINDAHL -.663 -.367 -.359 -.675 -.381 -.379
(0.063) (0.06) (0.071) (0.063) (0.06) (0.071)
DENSITY (acres/mbf) -.052 0.107 0.039 0.0001 0.135 0.096
(0.071) (0.066) (0.079) (0.074) (0.067) (0.083)
VOLUME (mbf) -.0007 -.001 -.0007 -.0007 -.001 -.0006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
HOUSING STARTS 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003
(0.00009) (0.00008) (0.0001) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.0001)
log SELL VALUE ($/mbf) 1.418 1.462 1.367 1.393
(0.066) (0.08) (0.071) (0.086)
log ROAD CONST ($/mbf) 0.057 0.04 0.059 0.043
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
log LOG COSTS ($/mbf) -1.536 -1.617 -1.488 -1.554
(0.063) (0.078) (0.068) (0.083)
log MFCT COSTS ($/mbf) -.061 -.111 -.047 -.089
(0.065) (0.084) (0.065) (0.084)
MISSING APPRAISAL 0.411 0.034 0.395 0.013
(0.186) (0.215) (0.186) (0.215)
log DISTANCE (KM) -.001 -.005
(0.019) (0.019)
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
QUARTER DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
COUNTY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FIRST STAGE 0.079 0.077 0.075 0.075
IV COEFFICIENT (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
N 3944 3944 3944 2702 3944 3944 3944 2702
R2 0.227 0.256 0.379 0.382
Table 5: Impact of potential entrants on all bids. Dependent variable is log of bid per volume. POT.
ENTRANTS are the bidders who bid in this auction or in those within 50 km over the next month. Instru-
ment for potential entrants is the number of unique mill bidders in a forest during the previous 6 months.
Observations drop when we include distance because we are missing that data for some bidders.
24bid is the valuation of the second highest valuation bidder. Therefore, to further push on whether
we can nd evidence of selection, we repeat the same test using only the winning bid. The results
appear in Table 6 and corroborate the evidence just presented using all bids.
Another way to investigate the amount of selection in the data is to analyze the impact of
potential entry on revenues. We know from above that models without selection will predict that
revenues fall as potential entry increases. Given that so few auctions fail to sell, the results are
virtually identical to those in Table 6, thus lending support to a model with selection.
Finally, we can test for evidence of selection by applying a Heckman selection model (Heckman
(1976)). Given that potential competition aects a bidder's decision to enter an auction, but not
his value conditional on entry, we can specify entry as a exible function of covariates, including
potential competition, at the rst stage, and exclude potential competition at the second stage bid
regression. A related method is used in Ellickson and Misra (forthcoming) in analyzing supermarket
pricing techniques when ex post revenue data is available. The results appear in Table 7. In the
rst stage entry probit, we include potential other mill and logger entrants and incorporate them
through a exible polynomial. It is clear that we are nding positive selection in that entrants are
likely to bid more aggressively. In addition, we see that the dierence in logger and mill bids is
masked by selection because the dierence grows when we control for selection. The results are
robust across a variety of specications and restricting the sample to only winning bids.26
After establishing the evidence of selection in the data, we now turn to estimating the full entry
and bidding model in order to perform counterfactual analysis.
6.3 Estimates
We now present estimates of the structural signal model. To estimate the model we use 888 out of
the 988 auctions used above. This selection is done primarily to drop outliers. For example, a few
auctions have very low USFS estimated sale values relative to the other auctions, and the highest
winning bid is over $4,255/mbf whereas the 99th percentile is only $320/mbf. Specically to be in
the estimation sample an auction must have:
1. a winning bid between $5/mbf and $350/mbf or result in no sale.
2. a USFS estimate of the expected sale value of the timber between $184/mbf and $428/mbf.
3. a USFS estimate of logging and manufacturing costs.
4. no more than 20 potential entrants (using the denition discussed above).
5. a location that can be identied so that the number of potential entrants can be calculated.
As can be seen from these denitions, considerable amounts of heterogeneity across auctions remains.
All of the specications assume that values are distributed log normal.
26Although not shown in the table, the results are also robust to changing the regressions from logs to levels.
25OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log POT ENTRANTS 0.279 0.273 0.19 0.174 1.119 1.130 0.924 1.086
(0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.039) (0.144) (0.147) (0.136) (0.203)
LOGGER -.222 -.192 -.074 -.026 -.280 -.285 -.155 -.111
(0.07) (0.071) (0.062) (0.076) (0.086) (0.089) (0.077) (0.103)
SCALE 0.416 0.32 0.169 0.327 0.246 0.071
(0.119) (0.102) (0.126) (0.148) (0.126) (0.168)
SPECIES HERFINDAHL -.618 -.332 -.368 -.598 -.360 -.340
(0.113) (0.102) (0.124) (0.14) (0.125) (0.165)
DENSITY (acres/mbf) -.066 0.065 -.037 0.117 0.199 0.294
(0.12) (0.103) (0.127) (0.152) (0.129) (0.182)
VOLUME (mbf) -.013 -.015 -.011 -.019 -.020 -.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
HOUSING STARTS 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.00007 0.00003 0.00009
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
log SELL VALUE ($/mbf) 1.276 1.135 0.952 0.843
(0.102) (0.119) (0.139) (0.17)
log ROAD CONST ($/mbf) 0.047 0.03 0.065 0.05
(0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.029)
log LOG COSTS ($/mbf) -1.766 -1.552 -1.437 -1.242
(0.1) (0.122) (0.136) (0.174)
log MFCT COSTS ($/mbf) 0.315 0.229 0.376 0.282
(0.096) (0.125) (0.119) (0.165)
MISSING APPRAISAL 0.131 -.113 -.052 -.187
(0.317) (0.399) (0.391) (0.527)
log DISTANCE (KM) 0.076 0.027
(0.032) (0.044)
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
QUARTER DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
COUNTY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FIRST STAGE 0.094 0.092 0.087 0.075
IV COEFFICIENT (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
N 945 945 945 671 945 945 945 671
R2 0.36 0.396 0.563 0.551
Table 6: Impact of potential entrants on winning bids. Dependent variable is log of the winning bid per
volume. POT. ENTRANTS are the bidders who bid in this auction or in those within 50 km over the next
month. Instrument for potential entrants is the number of unique mill bidders in a forest during the previous
6 months. Observations drop when we include distance because we are missing that data for some bidders.
26(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CONSTANT 2.941 2.690 4.030 3.071 3.335 3.333 3.043 3.037
(0.421) (0.421) (0.785) (0.768) (0.424) (0.423) (0.72) (0.713)
LOGGER -.154 -.388 -.202 -.638 -.118 -.211 -.054 -.285
(0.029) (0.047) (0.072) (0.096) (0.027) (0.041) (0.063) (0.081)
SCALE 0.184 0.187 0.34 0.339
(0.056) (0.056) (0.104) (0.103)
SPECIES HERFINDAHL -.359 -.351 -.324 -.292
(0.06) (0.06) (0.104) (0.103)
DENSITY (acres/mbf) 0.09 0.081 0.031 0.0008
(0.066) (0.066) (0.105) (0.104)
VOLUME (mbf) -.001 -.001 -.001 -.002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005)
HOUSING STARTS 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.0001) (0.0001)
log SELL VALUE ($/mbf) 1.448 1.466 1.360 1.397
(0.066) (0.066) (0.104) (0.103)
log ROAD CONST ($/mbf) 0.055 0.051 0.042 0.035
(0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018)
log LOG COSTS ($/mbf) -1.565 -1.608 -1.851 -1.946
(0.063) (0.065) (0.101) (0.102)
log MFCT COSTS ($/mbf) -.070 -.049 0.299 0.349
(0.065) (0.065) (0.098) (0.098)
MISSING APPRAISAL 0.421 0.437 0.178 0.221
(0.186) (0.186) (0.323) (0.32)
b  0.342 0.658 0.136 0.341
(0.054) (0.098) (0.046) (0.077)
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
QUARTER DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
COUNTY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ONLY WIN BID NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
N 3944 3944 945 945 3944 3944 945 945
R2 0.219 0.227 0.32 0.352 0.377 0.378 0.546 0.555
Table 7: Heckman selection evidence. Dependent variable is log of the bid per volume. The table displays
the second stage results of the two step selection model. The rst stage probit is of entry where the exogenous
shifters are potential other mill and logger entrants, incorporated as a exible polynomial. b  is the estimated
inverse Mills ratio from the rst stage.
27In all specications we assume that values are distributed lognormal and that the signal noise
is multiplicative, i.e., S = VA, A = e", where V  logN(;2
V ), "  N(0;2
"); where
 2 fMill, Loggerg. We have also estimated several models where values are normally distributed.
These estimates provide even stronger evidence of selection, but have the unattractive feature
that they imply that a signicant proportion of potential entrants have negative values. In future
revisions, we will estimate models where values can take on more exible distributions such as
Weibull, and we will also estimate models where the distribution of values is truncated at the
reserve price.27
While we present several sets of parameter estimates (those for the importance sampling and
nested pseudo likelihood approaches are in appendices), our main ndings about value distributions
and the degree of selection are summarized in Table 8, for an auction with average characteristics
including 4 mill and 5 logger potential entrants and a reserve price of $37/mbf. Each row of the
table reects a dierent empirical specication. The rst three columns report the mean value for
the average mill, the average mill that enters and the marginal mill (i.e., the expected value for
a mill receiving s0). The dierence between these columns reects the degree of selection among
mills. The next set of columns report mean values for loggers. The dierence between the average
values of mills and loggers indicates the degree of asymmetry between bidder types. A feature for
all of the specications is that the marginal mill has a lower expected value than the average mill.
This simply reects the fact that most mills enter. On the other hand, the marginal logger has a
higher value than the average logger, because most loggers choose not to enter. For the importance
sampling estimates we also display a picture of the value distributions for all, entrant and marginal
bidders, for both mills and loggers. The gures are similar for all estimates and so for brevity sake
we do not include them here.
6.3.1 Nested Fixed Point Estimates
Table 9 presents the results from three NFXP specications. In all cases we control for observable
factors that aect values using a pre-estimation regression as explained above. The specications
dier in their allowance for unobserved heterogeneity and the denition of the likelihood. The
estimates in the rst and third columns assume that there is no unobserved heterogeneity, while in
the second column we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in values that is normally distributed and
common to mills and loggers. The rst and second specications assume that non-bidders did not
pay K; the third specication does not. We describe how this alters the likelihood below.
All sets of estimates imply that the asymmetry between the average values of mills and loggers
is much larger than the dierence in bids ($20/mbf or 21%), which would be the basis of an
estimate that ignored selection. The estimate of  in the second column indicates that, controlling
for observables, there is evidence of signicant heterogeneity in mean values across auctions. In
27Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming) assume that the distribution of values is approximately truncated at the
reserve price in timber auctions. This requires entry costs to be relatively high to explain why rms do not enter. In
contrast, our current estimates imply that in many auctions potential entrants have values below the reserve price so




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mill 3.773 3.783 3.759
(0.018) (0.024) (0.019)
logger 2.913 2.749 2.748
(0.017) (0.024) (0.019)
V 0.975 1.094 1.030
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
" 0.3098 0.0328 0.2954
(0.0088) (0.010) (0.025)
K 0.0842 0.0110 0.0155
(0.0100) (0.002) (0.004)
 - 0.625 -
(0.002)
N 888 auctions 888 auctions 888 auctions
Log-likelihood -11,085.6 -10,738.2 -10,694.6
Assume only entrants pay K? YES YES NO
Table 9: NFXP parameter estimates. Nested xed point estimates of parameters for lognormal parame-
terization. The specications dier by their allowance for unobserved heterogeneity and the denition of the
likelihood. The second specication allows for there to be unobserved heterogeneity in values which is nor-
mally distributed and common to mills and loggers. The rst and second specication make the assumption
that non-bidders did not pay K. Standard errors are in parentheses.
comparing estimates of V in the rst two columns, we note that currently allowing for heterogeneity
across auctions does not reduce the estimated dispersion of values within a given auction, but that
it instead increases the estimated degree of selection (precision of "), which is a second factor
that, all else equal, can reduce the dispersion of observed bids.28 We note that the the average
value for mills in this model is higher than that in other models. We believe that this reects the
fact that our normality assumption for the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is not quite
appropriate for this set of auctions because it implies that in a small number of auctions values
should be exceptionally high, outside the range that we observe in the data. In future revisions we
will therefore try some alternative assumptions.
The nal column of Table 9 contains estimates where we change our denition of the likelihood.
The previous estimates assume that rms that do not submit qualifying bids do not enter (i.e.,
they do not pay K). However, this rules out the possibility that they enter, but then do not
attend the auction because they discover that their value is less than the reserve price. The change





R f(vj)Pr(enterjv = v;s
a;)dv

. The change maintains the estimated
dierence between logger and mills but, as expected, lowers the estimate of K.
The NFXP estimates assume that, if there are multiple equilibria, the rms will play the equi-
librium where mills have the lower s0. We now check whether the parameters can support multiple
equilibria. Figure 4 shows the type-symmetric \equilibrium best response functions" for mills and
28A closer look at the data indicates that it may be necessary to allow the degree of unobserved heterogeneity to
vary with the USFS's appraisal value, as auctions with lower appraisal values appear to be more heterogeneous.
30loggers for the representative average auction considered in Table 8, based on the parameters in
column (1). By an \equilibrium best response function" for mills we mean the strategy that would
represent a symmetric equilibrium among the set of 4 mills if the 5 loggers all used a particular
s0. As usual, type-symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibria are given by combinations where the best
response functions intersect. For these parameters and this auction there is only a single equilib-
rium due to the best response functions' atness. This reects the large asymmetry between the
types and the relatively small value of K. That is, rms want to enter if they are likely to have
values above the reserve even if their probability of winning is relatively small. While the estimates
are conditional on a particular equilibrium selection assumption, this provides some evidence that
concerns about multiple equilibria may not be too important empirically. This is also true for other
auctions and estimates that we have analyzed.























































Equilibrium Best Response Functions
µ
mill = 3.773, µ
logger = 2.913, σ
v = 0.975,
σ
ε = 0.310 , K = 0.084, R = 37, N
mill = 4, N
logger = 5
Figure 4: Best response functions for mills (solid) and loggers (dash-dot) based on nested xed
point parameter estimates for specication (1) in Table 9.
To give a better sense of what the distribution of values looks like, we present some examples
in Figures 5-6. We plot the distributions for the results in Table 12. The value distributions for
both types appear in Figure 5. The distributions corresponding to our other estimation methods
are very similar.
With our parameter estimates, if we assume a set of potential bidders and reserve price, we
can compare the entrants' and marginals' (those who observed s0) value distributions. For the case
where the reserve and the number of potential mill and logger entrants are set to their respective
means of $37/mbf, four and ve, this comparison for mills and loggers appears in Figure 6. As









Mill Parameters: MeanV = 3.7715; StdV = 1.0014; StdEps = 0.497; K = 0.0885
Logger Parameters: MeanV = 2.4264; StdV = 1.0014; StdEps = 0.497; K = 0.0885





Figure 5: Comparing the value distributions for Mills (dashed) and Loggers (solid). Based on
estimates in Table 12.
predicted by the Signal model, there is a stark dierence in the marginal and infra-marginal bidders
for each type.
7 The Benets of Increased Competition with Entry
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) establish a landmark result on the benets of competition. They show
that sellers prefer auctions with no reserve to those in which they can set an optimal reserve but
have one less bidder if (1) bidders' marginal revenue curves are downward sloping, (2) every bidder
is willing to make an opening oer of at least the seller's value in an English auction, (3) bidders
are symmetric and (4) participation is xed (Bulow and Klemperer (1996)). To understand this
result29, observe that the seller could do as well guaranteeing sale with N + 1 buyers as he could
running an optimal auction with N buyers: he could just run the optimal auction on an initial set
of N bidders and if the item didn't sell, simply give it to the N + 1th bidder. However, we know
from Myerson (1981) that the English auction with independent values is the optimal mechanism
among those that guarantee sale.30 That is, it is strictly better than the mechanism where the seller
runs the optimal auction on the rst N bidders and then assigns the good to the N +1th bidder in
the event of no sale.
29This discussion draws on Kirkegaard (2006).
30Strictly speaking, this is true as long as the buyer with the highest marginal revenue wins and any buyer with
the lowest possible signal earns zero payo from participating.








Mill Parameters: MeanV = 3.7715; StdV = 1.0014; StdEps = 0.497; K = 0.0885


















Logger Parameters: MeanV = 2.4264; StdV = 1.0014; StdEps = 0.497; K = 0.0885





Figure 6: Comparing the value distributions for entrant and \marginal" bidders by type. Based on
estimates in Table 12.
The result is not robust to including costly bidder participation where we now consider increasing
the number of potential entrants from N to N +1. This can trivially be seen in the LS model. Here
the optimal reserve price is independent of the number of potential bidders and equal to 0. We also
know that if bidders enter with probability less than one, the seller's expected revenues decline in
N. Conversely, the seller may prefer to increase the number of potential bidders by one and forgo
the opportunity to set a reserve when there is selective entry. For example, in the S model, if values
are distributed logN(5;:4), K = 20 and N = 4, with no reserve the seller's expected revenues are
128.9. If instead N = 3 but the seller can set the optimal reserve price of 73.9, the seller's expected
revenues are 118.17. The relative eciency of the LS and S models, from the seller's perspective,
makes the comparison of the benets of increased competition across the models intuitive. When the
number of potential entrants increases, each previous potential entrant is less likely to particpate.
This counteracts the benets naturally stemming from a larger pool of potential buyers. In a model
with no selection, there is a chance that \valuable" bidders to the seller cease participating, thus
making the \cost" of increased potential entry nontrivial. In a model with selection, on the other
hand, the bidders most likely to stop participating are the least valuable among previous entrants.
This in turn minimizes the \cost" of increasing potential entry.
Therefore, when costly entry is introduced, it is an empirical question whether the seller would
prefer the ability to set a reserve price or give up this power to gain an extra potential bidder.
It is here that our exible model of entry can be used to evaluate this question without imposing
restrictions that will determine the answer a priori. Table 10 compares the predicted revenues from
auctions with an optimal reserve to those without a reserve but one more bidder. The top (bottom)
panel pertains to increasing the number of potential mill (logger) entrants. The rst row gives the
expected revenues if the seller can set the optimal reserve and faces ve potential loggers and NM
potential mills, with NM varying across columns. The optimal reserve appears at the bottom of this
33Vary Mills:
NL = 5 and NM = 1 2 3 4 5
Expected Revenues with Optimal Reserve 34.688 50.199 64.517 77.341 89.020
Expected Revenues with No Reserve but:
NM + 1 Potential Mills 48.948 63.683 76.874 88.708 99.319
Optimal Reserve 35.75 44.75 46.75 49.75 53.75
Pr[No Sale] with Optimal Reserve 0.218 0.172 0.101 0.070 0.053
Vary Loggers:
NM = 5 and NL = 1 2 3 4 5
Expected Revenues with Optimal Reserve 73.076 74.166 75.245 76.267 77.341
Expected Revenues with No Reserve but:
NL + 1 Potential Loggers 73.208 74.474 75.687 76.874 77.940
Optimal Reserve 59.50 57.50 50.50 50.00 49.75
Pr[No Sale] with Optimal Reserve 0.147 0.128 0.084 0.076 0.070
Table 10: The Value of Competition. The table simulates the potential revenues for a set of bidders
when the seller sets the optimal reserve to the case where he cannot set the optimal reserve but has one
more bidder of a certain type. Results are based on parameter estimates in Table 12 and 100,000 simulated
auctions.
panel along with the corresponding probability that no sale occurs. In the table's second row we
compute the expected revenues if the seller faces one additional potential mill bidder but is unable
to set a reserve (so the number of mills in each column is NM + 1). The revenues rise for each
of the considered cases (as they do for all cases we have tried). The increase in revenues comes
despite the fact that with the additional mill all previous potential entrants increase their s0. The
benet the additional mill brings declines in the number of potential entrants, but still remains high
as even with many potential entrants. For example, an additional potential mill entrant increases
expected revenues by 11.5% relative to when the seller could set an optimal reserve but only had
ve potential mill and ve potential logger entrants.
The second panel in Table 10 repeats the exercise holding the number of potential mill entrants
xed at four and increasing the number of potential logger entrants. While the gains from increased
potential logger competition are not as great as that of mills, the seller always prefers an extra
logger potential bidder to the ability to set an optimal reserve. Interestingly, the optimal reserve
price falls in the number of potential logger entrants.
8 Conclusion
In most of the empirical auction literature, the econometrician assumes that the bids observed in
the data are submitted by a random sample of bidders. In this paper we relax this assumption,
developing and estimating an independent private value auction model where potential bidders
receive an imperfect signal about their value prior to making a costly entry decision. The estimation
allows for asymmetries in bidders and unobserved, to the econometrician, object heterogeneity.
We illustrate how incorrectly assuming that the current leading models of entry are the data
34generating processes will (i) cause biased estimates of model primitives and (ii) generate bias in
important counterfactual analyses. We also highlight that a feature of models without selection,
namely that seller revenues decrease in the number of potential bidders, can be used to test for the
presence of selection. This is because seller revenues can increase with potential entry in the more
general Signal model.
We apply our model to timber auctions to demonstrate how ignoring selection in bidder partici-
pation can aect an important and often studied empirical setting. Across a variety of specications
our structural estimates suggest that potential bidders have quite precise estimates of their value
prior to paying an entry cost. This precision generates a high degree of selection in the data.
We take advantage of the exible entry model to reevaluate the well known theory result re-
garding the benets of competition. Specically, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that with xed
participation a seller prefers an auction with no reserve to one with an optimal reserve but one less
bidder. Extending the result to statements about the eects of increasing potential competition
is not straightforward. In particular, depending on the amount of selection in the entry process,
the seller may not prefer to increase the number of potential entrants if he must lose the ability to
set an optimal reserve price. Our exible model of entry, therefore, can be usefully employed to
understand the benets of competition when entry is costly. Using our structural estimates we nd
if its goal is to maximize auction revenue, then the USFS should willingly forgo its ability to set an
optimal reserve price in favor of attracting one more potential entrant.
35A Importance Sampling
The models estimated using NFXP assume that there is no heterogeneity in the parameters 2
V ; K
and 2
" across auctions. This may be incorrect as it is at least plausible that features of the tract,
such as the density of wood and whether the sale is a scaled sale, would aect these parameters.31
To allow for heterogeneity in multiple parameters we follow the importance sampling approach
suggested by Ackerberg (2009). The benet of this approach is that we do not need to resolve the
entry game for each auction at each value of the parameters. Instead, we assume that all of the
parameters of the model have some parametric distribution across auctions, which can depend on
observables. We will assume that the parameters are jointly normally distributed with truncation
where appropriate. We solve each auction and calculate the likelihood of the observed decisions for
many dierent simulation draws of the parameters (done using many processors) and then estimate
the distribution of the parameters by reweighting the likelihoods for each simulated game.32 When
solving the games we assume that the equilibrium played involves the type with the higher mean
having a lower s0, and to make sure that there is exactly one equilibrium of this kind we assume
that the parameters 2
V ;K and 2
" are the same across potential entrants within an auction even if
they are dierent across auctions.
Specically we assume that
Vmill  logN(mill;a;2
V;a) where mill;a  N(Xa1;!2
;mill)
Vlogger  logN(mill;a + dierence,a;2
V;a) where dierence,a  Truncated N(Xa2;!2
;dierence)
2




Ka  Truncated N(Xa4;!2
K)
2
";a  Truncated N(Xa5;!2
2
")
where the Xs are observable variables. The parameters to estimate are the parameters which









". We label the collection of these parameters 
. The truncation points are chosen so that
loggers always have weakly lower mean values than mills and both K and the variance parameters
are positive.
For given parameters 




31In a scaled sale a seller bids a price for a given volume of wood and the total price paid is determined ex post by
the total amount of wood on the tract. A bidder's value may therefore depend less on the total volume of wood on
the tract. On the other hand, in a non-scaled sale a bidder submits a price for all of the wood on the tract and so it
is much more important to estimate the amount of wood on the tract accurately.
32Hartmann (2006) and Hartmann and Nair (forthcoming) provide applications of these methods to consumer
dynamic discrete problems. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (forthcoming) use a related method to analyze entry into rst
price procurement auctions assuming the LS model. However, their method assumes a complete information entry
game where rms get draws on entry costs that depend on who else enters the auction. We do not make this
assumption.
36where La() is the likelihood of the outcome for a given auction for a given set of structural
parameters dened in the discussion of the NFXP algorithm. Estimation becomes costly if whenever
one alters 
 the set of s to be evaluated is also altered. To motivate the use of importance sampling






where g(jXa) is an importance sampling density where the support of  does not depend on 
;
which is true in our case because the truncation points are not functions of the parameters. The









where s are vectors of parameter draws from g(sjXa). For g we use uniform distributions over




g(sjXa) change as 
 varies but La(s) does not have to be recalculated. This allows
us to control for a large number of observable variables directly, rather than using an ad-hoc rst
stage. Standard errors are calculated using a non-parametric bootstrap where we resample games
and their associated draws with replacement.
A.1 Importance Sampling Results
The importance sampling estimates shown in Table 11 make the same equilibrium assumptions as
the NFXP estimates, but allow us to control for observed auction heterogeneity as part of estimation
and to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the parameters across auctions. The estimates in Table
11 allow the USFS estimate of sale value and its estimate of logging costs to aect mill and logger
values (where logger = mill + dierence). These variables are consistently the most signicant
in regressions of reserve prices or winning bids on observables. The right hand column shows the
median value of the parameters across the 888 auctions in the sample, taking into account observable
auction characteristics and the fact that some of the parameter distributions are truncated. The
coecients show that tracts with greater sale values and lower costs are more valuable as one
would expect. Interestingly the dierence in values between mills and loggers appears independent
of these variables, although it does appear that there is both unobserved heterogeneity in values
across auctions (the standard deviation of mill) and heterogeneity in the dierence between mill
and logger mean values across auctions (the standard deviation of dierence), which was not allowed
for in any of the NFXP estimates.
The estimates for K and " in Table 11 indicate that entry costs are low and signals are quite
precise, leading to a lot of selection.
The specication in Table 12 adds additional observable heterogeneity to, and uses the dierent
denition of the likelihood, than the specication in Table 11. Here we allow for the possibility




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38less than the reserve price. The main change is that the standard deviation of the distribution
of ";a increases quite signicantly so that now the median value of ";a across auctions is 0.4970.
However, although this implies signals are less informative, there is still signicant selection since
the dierence in the expected values of the marginal and inframarginal mill entrant are quite similar
to the previous estimates (see Table 8). For both types of rms the reduced precision of the signal,
and low K, leads them to use lower s0s as entry costs are low.
B Nested Pseudo Likelihood
The nal estimator we consider is the Nested Pseudo-Likelihood estimator of Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2007). We use this estimator to see how the results change when we relax the assumption that
the parameters 2
V ;2
" and K are common across types within an auction and that the equilibrium
played has mills (the type with higher mean values) using a lower s0. The NPL estimator, which
to our knowledge has not previously been used in the auction literature, works by iterating two
steps. In the rst step, the structural parameters are estimated using the likelihood of rms' entry
decisions and bids, given a set of beliefs about other players' strategies. In the auction context,
these are beliefs about the distribution of the highest value of other entering rms, since it is this
distribution that determines the probability that a rm wins and its surplus if it wins. In the second
step, these beliefs are updated using the strategies implied by the parameters from the rst step. If
this process converges (which is not guaranteed in the case of the game), players will be playing best
responses given their beliefs and beliefs will be consistent with players' strategies, so that strategies
and beliefs will constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The appendix gives more complete details.
The NPL estimator is potentially consistent for any specication of initial beliefs. However, if
the process is started from beliefs that are close to potential entrants' equilibrium beliefs, then it
can be hoped - although it is not guaranteed - that the procedure will converge to the particular
equilibrium that is being played, even if it does not satisfy the restrictions that we make in our other
procedures. To get our initial estimates of beliefs we estimate a parametric distribution (Weibull)
for the value of the highest bid, having controlled for observable covariates in a rst-step.33
Here we describe the nested pseudo-likelihood procedure in greater detail since we are not aware
of it being used elsewhere in the empirical auction literature. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) and
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) show how this procedure can be used to estimate both single agent
models and games of incomplete information with a lower computational burden than nested xed
point methods. Applied to games, the procedure involves the iteration of two steps: in the rst
step, a pseudo-likelihood for each player's action is maximized to give estimates of the parameters,
based on each player's best response to a set of beliefs about the actions of other players. In the rst
step, these beliefs are treated as data. In the second step, the new parameter estimates are used to
33Note that this cannot give us a consistent estimate of what we actually want: a player's beliefs about the highest
value of other players. That is because this object is not observed in the data since not all players can be assumed
to bid their values. Therefore we have to use Nested Pseudo-Likelihood, which does not require consistent rst stage












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40update the beliefs. The two-step process is iterated until both beliefs and the parameters converge,
at which point players will be playing best responses given their beliefs and beliefs will be consistent
with players' strategies (i.e., strategies and beliefs will constitute a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium).
The method contrasts with a nested xed point procedure where an equilibrium is found at each
step, and it also extends to cases where there is a nite mixture of unobserved heterogeneity.
Throughout much of this section we simplify the model that we are trying to estimate for
expositional purposes. One important simplication we make is that we observe data generated
by a second price auction. Our methodology is easily extended to cases where the data generating
process is an English auction or a more general open outcry auction where bidders may not bid up
to their values. We develop these extensions more fully in Appendix B. Finally, although we ignore
reserve prices here, it is straightforward to include them, and we do in our empirical application.
Before describing the details of the method, we outline some additional notation. We then
present the estimation method with multiple (observed) types of potential entrants, but with no
unobserved heterogeneity between auctions. Then we describe how the routine changes when there is
unobserved heterogeneity between auction types, before making some comments about how multiple
equilibria may aect estimation.
B.0.1 Notation
To keep the notation simple, we will assume that  = 2 (two types of potential entrants) for each
auction and that within a type, all bidders are symmetric and use symmetric entry strategies. The
type of each potential entrant is observed to the econometrician. Initially, we will also assume that
all T observed auctions are identical i.e., for each auction bidders values are drawn from the same
distributions FV
 (pdf fV
 ), where FV
 = N(;2
V ) and that N is the same across auctions. The
distribution of the signal noise around the true value is also normal, i.e., F" = N(0;2
"). We will
also assume that 2
v; 2
" and K are the same across bidder types, although it is straightforward to
relax this assumption. The complete set of parameters to be estimated is  2 f1;2;2
v;2
";Kg.
To explain the estimation procedure, some additional notation will be useful. When a type
 bidder receives a signal s, his posterior belief is that his true value is distributed F0
(:js;) =
N( +(1 )s;02












 (:) denotes the beliefs that
a type  bidder has about the distribution of the highest bid that will be placed by other bidders
(hence the  i) when he makes his entry decision. g i
 (:) is the associated pdf. s0
(G i
 ;) is the
signal which makes a type  bidder indierent about entering given the parameters and his beliefs.
s0
(G i
 ;) is dened implicitly by the following equation, because the marginal entrant's expected













;)dv   K = 0 (2)
Given G i
 ,  and f0
; s0
 can be solved for eciently using a standard non-linear solver.
For each potential entrant i, we observe either that he does not enter or that he enters and
41submits a bid equal to b. Denote the observed action ai, where ai = 0 if there is no entry and
ai = bi otherwise. Given (G i








 ;)   vj2
")fV
 (v)dv (3)











It is possible to make less restrictive modeling assumptions by altering the action probabilities.
For example, we can drop the assumption that we observe the winning bidder's bid, which would be
the case in an English Button auction. Alternatively, we could loosen the restriction that we observe
all bidders' values, as might be the case in an open outcry auction (see for example Haile and Tamer
(2003)). These alternative action probabilities can be used instead to form the pseudo-likelihood
used in our estimation. These options are given in Appendix B.
Before estimation begins, we specify initial guesses of G i
 (:) for each type of player. With no
unobserved auction heterogeneity, it is straightforward to approximate these distributions from the
data using either parametric or non-parametric techniques.
The iterative pseudo-likelihood procedure has two steps. For a particular iteration k; the two
steps proceed as follows:
Step 1 (maximum pseudo-log likelihood estimation). In this step the parameters  are
estimated using the best response probabilities (3) and (4) given values for G i
 (:). Formally:










For each value of the parameters, the pseudo-likelihood is calculated by solving for s0
(G i
 ;) for
each player type, and then calculating the probability of the observed action for each potential
entrant.
Step 2 (update G). In this step the parameter values and the nal values of s0
(G i
 ;) from
Step 1 are used to update the G i
 distributions. For a bidder of type 1, the probability that the






























































Steps 1 and 2 are iterated until both G and  converge.34
In practice, it was found that the algorithm converged more quickly if G i was updated only
34In practice we set the tolerance level to 1.0E-6.
42" N1 N2 b 1 b 2 b V b " b K
5.00 1 5 209.4751 200.2048 24.8229 4.8584 10.1479
(0.393) (0.447) (0.212) (0.177) (0.196)
5.00 2 5 209.6216 200.2784 25.0191 5.0690 10.2776
(0.206) (0.373) (0.171) (0.266) (0.291)
5.00 3 5 209.7727 199.9918 25.0671 4.8339 10.2015
(0.220) (0.389) (0.169) (0.183) (0.259)
0.55 2 4 209.5822 200.3087 25.0717 0.6748 10.3577
(0.236) (0.277) (0.122) (0.125) (0.241)
55.00 2 4 209.5344 197.4346 25.1296 50.8864 9.7548
(0.220) (3.413) (0.214) (7.426) (0.646)
Table 13: Recovering Parameters, No Unobserved Heterogeneity. The table displays estimates of model
parameters assuming the correct Signal model. Based on generating T = 5000 auctions where 1 = 210,
2 = 200, V = 25, K = 10. The cases when " = 0:55 and 55 reect the S and LS models, respectively.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
partially in Step 2, i.e., we use a convex combination of G
 i;k 1
1 (x) and \ G i
1 (x).35
This description assumes that there is no observed heterogeneity between auctions. In practice,
one could parameterize  as a function of observed covariates, e.g., 1 = X and 2 = X+, as is
done elsewhere in the literature (see for example Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming)) and could
allow for a dierent number of potential entrants in dierent auctions. In this case, we alter the
computational routine to use a separate G i
 and s0
(G i
 ;) for each distinct set of auction covariates.
In practice this increases computational demands and so we control for observed heterogeneity in a
pre-step regression described in Section 5.
B.1 NPL Monte Carlos
In this section we present several Monte Carlo experiments to illustrate our estimation method. We
begin with the case with asymmetric bidders. We consider two bidder types who dier in their mean
value. Table 13 displays the results from several experiments. The rst three rows illustrate how
we can recover the parameters of interest as the number of potential bidders varies for a reasonable
amount of variation in the signal. We believe that one benet of the model is that it is general
enough to approximately match the two polar entry cases used in the literature so far. The next
two rows attempt to illustrate this. They approximate a data generating process akin to the S and
LS models, respectively. In the fourth row " = 0:55 and so bidders almost perfectly know their
value prior to paying the entry cost. In the nal row we set " = 55 and so bidders have almost
no information regarding their value prior to entry. In either case we can recover the underlying
parameters quite well.
















Klogger same as mill 0.2251
(0.0964)
N 888 auctions 888 auctions
Table 14: Nested Pseudo-Likelihood parameter estimates. Nested Pseudo-Likelihood estimates of pa-
rameters for lognormal parameterization. The two specications dier on their restrictions regarding signal
variance. The latter model allows it to dier across types due to dierences in value dispersion and noise
dispersion. Standard errors are in parentheses.
B.2 NPL Results
Table 14 shows the estimates from two Nested Pseudo-Likelihood specications. The rst column
shows the results when the parameters V ;" and K are constrained to be the same for mills and
loggers. In the second column these parameters are allowed to be dierent across the rm types.
We can permit these dierences since we no longer make assumptions about equilibrium selection
that require the parameters to be the same. The main ndings are that loggers are estimated to
have values that are less dispersed than mills - a plausible nding since loggers are less tied to the
particular specications of their manufacturing facility - and that their K and " are somewhat
higher, suggesting that signals are less precise. However, because V is also lower, their posterior
belief about their value is still quite precise and the degree of selection for loggers in Table 8 is quite
similar to the other specications.36
C Alternative Data Generating Processes
Here we outline how we can adapt the estimation procedure to loosen our restrictive assumptions
about the data generating process.






, so an increase in 
2
" and a decrease in 
2
V tend to oset.
44C.1 English Button Auction
If we assume that the data generating process is the classic English Button Auction where an
auctioneer continuously raises the price and bidders press a button signaling their willingness to
participate, we can interpret bidders' bids as their dropout points, which are their values. Thus any
bid we observe is a bidder's value. However, we do not observe the winning bidder's value since he
wins when the bidder with the second highest value removes his nger from the button. Therefore,
while the probabilities of a bidder not entering and submitting an observed bid are as in Equations
3 and 4, respectively, we now lose the information that observing the winner's bid provides. Instead,














C.2 General Open Outcry Auction
The English Button auction, as imagined by Milgrom and Weber (1982), is obviously a simplication
of what often are open outcry auctions. In these auctions we may worry that submitted bids are not
actually bidders' values. Instead, a very general set of assumptions one can make upon observing a
set of bids from a set of potential bidders, where the second highest bid b2, are:
A1 The winning bidder had a value greater than b2.
A2 The losing bidder that bid the most had a value equal to b2.
A3 All participating bidders had values less than b2 but greater than the reserve price r.
Probability Pr(ai = winjG i
 ;) is as in Equation 7. The probability that the highest losing
bidder had a value equal to b2 is as in Equation 4. However, for those bidders for which we observe
a losing bid, we now say:
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